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Bargaining, Independence, and the Rationality of Fair Division Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Lopomo, G.
Ok, E.A.
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We consider two person bargaining games with independent preferences, with and without bilateral incomplete information. We show that, both in the ultimatum game and in the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are fully consistent with all robust experimental regularities which falsify the standard game theoretic model: occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and outcomes that come close to the equal split of the pie.
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number
98-18.
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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1998Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-18Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012 Phone: (212) 998-8936 Fax: (212) 995-3932 Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012 Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Anne Stubing).
Keywords: BARGAINING ; GAMES ; Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Clark, Andrew E. & Oswald, Andrew J., 1996.
"Satisfaction and comparison income ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 359-381, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ellingsen, Tore, 1997.
"The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
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Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982.
"An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bolton Gary E. & Zwick Rami, 1995.
"Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 95-121, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daughety, A.F., 1993.
"Socially-Influenced Choice : Equity Considerations in Models of Consumer Choice and Games ,"
Working Papers
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Kirchsteiger, Georg, 1994.
"The role of envy in ultimatum games ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David K. Levine, 1998.
"Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment ,"
Review of Economic Dynamics ,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bolton, Gary E, 1991.
"A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-136, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Herrero, Maria Jose, 1989.
"The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 266-277, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993.
"Bargaining with Private Information ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989.
"An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 355-84, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986.
"Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985.
"Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1098, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!]
Bolton, Gary E., 1997.
"The rationality of splitting equally ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 365-381, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cho, In-Koo, 1990.
"Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 575-95, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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