Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints

Contents:

Author Info

  • Sandro Brusco
  • Giuseppe Lopomo

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~glopomo/bio/papers/budco04.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 403 Forbidden (http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~glopomo/bio/papers/budco04.pdf [302 Found]--> https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~glopomo/bio/papers/budco04.pdf). If this is indeed the case, please notify (David K. Levine)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000373.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000373

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2001. "High Bids and Broke Winners," Staff General Research Papers 12665, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000766, David K. Levine.
  3. Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
  4. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-52, May.
  5. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21, January.
  7. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2002. "Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 215-236, May.
  8. David J. Salant, 1997. "Up in the Air: GTE's Experience in the MTA Auction for Personal Communication Services Licenses," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 549-572, 09.
  9. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
  10. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2002. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 407-436.
  11. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9805001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1999.
  12. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2008. "Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, Elsevier.
  13. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
  14. Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-72, March.
  15. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2001. "Collusion via Signaling in Multiple Object Auctions with Complementarities- An Experimental Test," Working Papers 200102, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  16. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  17. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2003. "On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 374-392, June.
  18. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  19. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
  20. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
  21. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
  22. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 198-233, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe & Marx, Leslie M., 2009. "The [`]Google effect' in the FCC's 700Â MHz auction," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 101-114, June.
  2. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2005. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 05-13, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  3. Zheng, Charles Z., 2012. "Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 648-664.
  4. Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
  5. David McAdams & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Brian Murray, . "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics 10-64, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  6. Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx & David McAdams & Brian Murray, 2011. "Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 25-43, Winter.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000373. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.