Optimal fees in internet auctions
AbstractAn auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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