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Competition of E-Commerce Intermediaries

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  • Alexander Matros

    ()
    (University of South Carolina)

  • Andriy Zapechelnyuk

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

Abstract

In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show that two non-identical shops may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers is sufficiently differentiated in their time preferences. In such an equilibrium less patient sellers choose the more popular (with a higher rate of arrival of new buyers) and more expensive shop, while more patient sellers prefer the less popular and cheaper one.

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Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 675.

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Date of creation: Nov 2010
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Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp675

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Keywords: E-commerce; Intermediary; Competition; Listing fee; Closing fee;

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  1. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Monopoly with Resale," Working Papers 2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1393, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1405, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Staff General Research Papers 12664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Marco Pagnozzi, 2004. "Bidding to Lose? Auctions with Resale," CSEF Working Papers 116, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Nov 2006.
  4. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Staff General Research Papers 32106, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Optimal Fees in Internet Auctions," Discussion Papers 3, Kyiv School of Economics.
  6. Haile, Philip A., 2000. "Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 231-248, November.
  7. Stahl, Dale O, II, 1989. "Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 700-712, September.
  8. Horstmann, Ignatius J & LaCasse, Chantale, 1997. "Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Resale Option," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 663-84, September.
  9. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2008. "Competing auctions with endogenous quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 1-27, July.
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