Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator
AbstractWe consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 670.
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Optimal mechanism; Vickrey auction; Mediator;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-09-11 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-09-11 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008.
"Optimal fees in internet auctions,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 155-163, September.
- Marco Pagnozzi, 2004.
"Bidding to Lose? Auctions with Resale,"
CSEF Working Papers
116, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Nov 2006.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003.
"Monopoly with Resale,"
2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1405, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Monopoly with Resale," Discussion Papers 1393, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jullien, B. & Mariotti, T., 2006.
"Auction and the informed seller problem,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 225-258, August.
- Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
- Horstmann, Ignatius J & LaCasse, Chantale, 1997.
"Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Resale Option,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 663-84, September.
- Horstmann, I.J. & LaCasse, C., 1995. "Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Re-Sale Option," Working Papers 9507e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002.
"Optimal Auction with Resale,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2197-2224, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nick Vriend).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.