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Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Alexander Matros
Andriy Zapechelnyuk
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Paper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
202.
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Date of creation: Jan 2006Date of revision:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008.
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"Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets ,"
IDEI Working Papers
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
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Wilson, Robert B, 1985.
"Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions ,"
Econometrica ,
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Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002.
"Optimal Auction with Resale ,"
Econometrica ,
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McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997.
"Sequentially Optimal Auctions ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
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Other versions: Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983.
"Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
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Other versions: Haile, Philip A., 2000.
"Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 231-248, November.
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Haile, Philip A., 2003.
"Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
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Reisinger, Markus, 2004.
"Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
478, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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Gupta, Madhurima & Lebrun, Bernard, 1999.
"First price auctions with resale ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 181-185, August.
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Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985.
"Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1098, UCLA Department of Economics.
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