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Competition in Two-Sided Markets

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Author Info
Mark Armstrong Author-Email: mark.armstrong@ucl.ac.uk (University College of London)

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Abstract

Many markets involve two groups of agents who interact via "platforms," where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the size of the other group that joins the platform. I present three models of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms "competitive bottlenecks" where one group joins all platforms.The determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the magnitude of the cross group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump-sum or per-transaction basis, and (iii) whether agents join one platform or several platforms. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=buy&year=2006&issue=aut&page=668&tid=30492&sc=1869P1N9.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 668-691
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:668-691

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 353-380, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Laussel, Dider & Sonnac, Nathalie, 2001. "Press advertising and the ascent of the 'Pensee Unique'," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 641-651, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 152, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. " Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-28, Summer.
  5. Howard Smith & Donald Hay, 2005. "Streets, Malls, and Supermarkets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(1), pages 29-59, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Konrad Stahl, 1982. "Location and Spatial Pricing Theory with Nonconvex Transportation Cost Schedules," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 575-582, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. van Raalte, Chris & Webers, Harry, 1998. "Spatial competition with intermediated matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 477-488, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wright, Julian, 2002. "Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(3), pages 289-315, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Simon P. Anderson, 2005. "Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(4), pages 947-972, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Beggs, Alan W, 1994. "Mergers and Malls," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 419-28, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2001. "Competitive Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 579-605, Winter.
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