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Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities

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Author Info
Reisinger, Markus
Abstract

This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, the advertisers, exerts a negative externality on the ther side, the users. It is shown that if platforms can charge advertisers only, a higher degree of competition for users can lead to higher profits because competition on the advertisers' side is reduced. If platforms can charge users as well, profits might increase or decrease, the latter because of increased competition through the additional instrument of the user fee. Nevertheless the equilibrium with user fee is more efficient.

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Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 478.

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Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:478

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Related research
Keywords: Negative Externalities Price Competition Two-Sided Markets

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Anderson, Simon P. & Leruth, Luc, 1993. "Why firms may prefer not to price discriminate via mixed bundling," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 49-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. ROCHET, Jean-Charles & TIROLE, Jean, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 152, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis," Virginia Economics Online Papers 358, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Esther Gal-Or & Anthony Dukes, 2006. "On the Profitability of Media Mergers," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(2), pages 489-526, March. [Downloadable!]
  6. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Vives, Xavier, 1988. "On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 122-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kind, Hans Jarle & Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars, 2005. "Advertising on TV: Under- or Overprovision?," Memorandum 15/2005, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Pedro Barros & Hans Kind & Tore Nilssen & Lars Sørgard, 2005. "Media Competition on the Internet," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1343-1343. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Wright, Julian, 2003. "Optimal card payment systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 587-612, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Farrell, Joseph & Klemperer, Paul, 2006. "Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 5798, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Mark Armstrong, 2005. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Industrial Organization 0505009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. CRAMPES, Claude & HARITCHABALET, Carole & JULLIEN, Bruno, 2006. "Advertising, Competition and Entry in Media Industries," IDEI Working Papers 374, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Schmidtke, Richard, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities," Discussion Papers in Economics 963, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2006. "Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000113, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Richard Schmidtke, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Optimal Fees in Internet Auctions," Discussion Papers 3, Kyiv School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ulrich Kaiser, 2007. "Do Media Consumers Really Dislike Advertising? An Empirical Assessment of a Popular Assumption in Economic Theory," CIE Discussion Papers 2007-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Martin Bandulet, 2005. "On the Efficiency of Spam Mailing and Portal Advertising," Discussion Paper Series 275, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Richard Schmidtke, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities," Discussion Papers 133, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. ROCHET, Jean-Charles & TIROLE, Jean, 2005. "Two-Sided Markets : A Progress Report," IDEI Working Papers 275, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email: rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
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