Models of spatial competition have proven useful in describing differentiated product markets. A serious problem is the nonexistence of Nash equilibria. This problem is resolved by modelling the price formation process using the core. The equilibrium is the outcome of a two-stage process. In the first stage, two firms choose locations simultaneously. The second stage has prices determined by an allocation in the core of a cooperative subgame allowing for coalitions of buyers and sellers. These prices approach the competitive level as the distance between the firms goes to zero, thus capturing the essence of duopoly rivalry.
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Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
704.
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Jan K. Brueckner & Jacques-FranÁois Thisse & Yves Zenou, 2002.
"Local Labor Markets, Job Matching, and Urban Location,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 155-171, February.
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Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton, 2006.
"An Experiment on Spatial Price Competition,"
Discussion Papers
2006-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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