This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal Fees in Internet Auctions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alexander Matros (University of Pittsburgh)
Andriy Zapechelnyuk () (Kyiv School of Economics)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://kse.org.ua/RePEc/pdf/KSE_dp3.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Revised version, January 2008
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Kyiv School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 3.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kse:dpaper:3

Note: Forthcoming in Review of Economic Design
Contact details of provider:
Phone: (38-044)492-8012
Fax: (38-044)492-8011
Email:
Web page: http://kse.org.ua/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Andriy Zapechelnyuk).

Related research
Keywords: Internet auctions auctions with resale auction house listing fee closing fee

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. ROCHET, Jean-Charles & TIROLE, Jean, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 152, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. repec:att:wimass:19199933 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 753-769, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2197-2224, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Monopoly with Resale," Working Papers 2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. McAfee, R. Preston & Vincent, Daniel, 1997. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 246-276, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Haile, Philip A., 2000. "Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 231-248, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Reisinger, Markus, 2004. "Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities," Discussion Papers in Economics 478, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Gupta, Madhurima & Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First price auctions with resale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 181-185, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.