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Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

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  • Sandro Brusco
  • Giuseppe Lopomo

Abstract

Collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects, even with large complementarities in the buyers' utility functions. The bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. In the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized. The scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000385.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000385

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  1. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
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  17. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Peter Cramton, 2000. "Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00senate, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 11 Mar 2000.
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