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Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types

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Yeon-Koo Che
Ian Gale

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File URL: http://www.najecon.org/v11.htm
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Paper provided by www.najecon.org in its series NajEcon Working Paper Reviews with number 784828000000000012.

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Date of creation: 19 Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000012

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Zheng, Charles Z., 2001. "High Bids and Broke Winners," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 129-171, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 1989. "Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(3), pages 421-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Neilson William S., 1994. "Second Price Auctions without Expected Utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 136-151, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Matthews, Steven, 1987. "Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 633-46, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, Joan G, 1985. "Auction Theory with Private Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 150-55, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Hong Chew Soo & Hui Mao Mei, 1995. "A Schur Concave Characterization of Risk Aversion for Non-expected Utility Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 402-435, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Dekel, Eddie, 1986. "An axiomatic characterization of preferences under uncertainty: Weakening the independence axiom," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 304-318, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Machina, Mark J, 1982. ""Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 277-323, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 2001. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(1), pages 155-79, January.
  15. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Riley, John G, 1989. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 41-50, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2003. "On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 374-392, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Maskin, Eric S., 2000. "Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 667-681, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "Payoff Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk," Staff General Research Papers 10129, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  21. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions," Working Papers 2004.148, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  22. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Robert, Jacques, 1996. "Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 181-186, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 231-237, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Svaiter, Benar Fux & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2008. "Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 681, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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