Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions
AbstractThis paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The scoring rule reduces the multidimensional bids submitted by each supplier to a single dimension, the score, which is used for deciding on the allocation and the resulting contractual obligation. We exploit this idea and obtain two kinds of results. First, we characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional types. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria in these scoring auctions and those in standard single object IPV auctions. Second, we prove a new expected utility equivalence theorem for quasi-linear scoring auctions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2004.148.
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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