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Properties of Scoring Auctions

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Author Info
Asker, John
Cantillon, Estelle

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Abstract

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour in scoring auctions when suppliers’ private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behaviour and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4734.

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Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4734

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Related research
Keywords: auction; multi-attribute; multidimensional private information; procurement;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. John Asker, 2007. "This Paper is No Longer Available," Working Papers 07-2, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas & Rasim Ozcan & Ilke Onur, 2008. "Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey," Working Papers 0814, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2006. "Procurement When Price and Quality Matter," Working Papers 06-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Pierangelo Mori, 2008. "Design of Multidimensional Franchise Auctions by an Ignorant Principal," Working Papers Series wp2008_13.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche. [Downloadable!]
  5. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Elmar Wolfstetter, 2005. "Procurement of Goods and Services – Scope and Government," Discussion Papers 93, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2005. "Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 5276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steve Tadelis, 2006. "Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Müller, Rudolf & Perea, Andrés & Wolf, Sascha, 2007. "Combinatorial Scoring Auctions," Research Memoranda 020, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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