An auction market for journal articles
AbstractEconomic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the "academic dollars" for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This income indicates academic productivity (facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion); its recirculation to journals further stimulates quality competition.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 145 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Academic journals; Academic productivity; Market design; A11; D02; D44;
Other versions of this item:
- Prüfer, J. & Zetland, D., 2007. "An Auction Market for Journal Articles," Discussion Paper 2007-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Prüfer, J. & Zetland, D., 2007. "An Auction Market for Journal Articles," Discussion Paper 2007-027, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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