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Procyclicality and the New Basel Accord: banks' choice of loan rating system

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Author Info
Eva Catarineu-Rabell
Patricia Jackson
Dimitrios P. Tsomocos

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Abstract

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2005, new risk-based requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. These will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. This article examines the implications of these new risk-based requirements for procyclicality, in particular whether the choice of particular loan rating system by the banks would significantly increase the likelihood of sharp increases in capital requirements in recessions, creating the potential for classic credit crunches. The paper finds that rating schemes which are designed to be stable over the cycle, akin to those of the external rating agencies, would not increase procyclicality but ratings which are conditioned on the point in the cycle, akin to a Merton approach, could substantially increase procyclicality. This makes the question of which rating schemes banks will use very important. The paper uses a general equilibrium model of the financial system to explore whether banks would choose to use a countercyclical, procyclical or neutral rating scheme. The results indicate that banks would not choose a stable rating approach which has important policy implications for the design of the Accord. The Committee may need to rule out some types of rating scheme currently used by the banks.

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Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its journal Conference Series ; [Proceedings].

Volume (Year): (2002)
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:2002:x:2

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Related research
Keywords: Risk management;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Pamela Nickell & William Perraudin & Simone Varotto, . "Ratings versus equity-based credit risk modelling: an empirical analysis," Bank of England working papers 132, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  2. M. Shubik & D. Tsomocos, 1992. "A strategic market game with a mutual bank with fractional reserves and redemption in gold," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 123-150, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Con Keating & Hyun Song Shin & Charles Goodhart & Jon Danielsson, 2001. "An Academic Response to Basel II," FMG Special Papers sp130, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael B. Gordy, 1998. "A comparative anatomy of credit risk models," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-47, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  5. Dimitrios Tsomocos, 2003. "Equilibrium Analysis, Banking, Contagion and Financial Fragility," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe03, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric S, 1997. "The International Transmission of Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 495-505, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. " Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-87, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Estrella, Arturo, 2004. "The cyclical behavior of optimal bank capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1469-1498, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jackson, Patricia & Perraudin, William & Saporta, Victoria, 2002. "Regulatory and "economic" solvency standards for internationally active banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 953-976, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lopez, Jose A., 2004. "The empirical relationship between average asset correlation, firm probability of default, and asset size," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 265-283, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Jones, David, 2000. "Emerging problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 35-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 1997. "Collateral damage: effects of the Japanese real estate collapse on credit availability and real activity in the United States," Working Papers 97-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  14. Miguel Angel Segoviano & Philip Lowe, 2002. "Internal ratings, the business cycle, and capital requirements: some evidence from an emerging market economy," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  15. Herring, Richard J, 1999. "Credit Risk and Financial Instability," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 63-79, Autumn.
  16. Greenbaum, Stuart I. & Kanatas, George & Venezia, Itzhak, 1989. "Equilibrium loan pricing under the bank-client relationship," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 221-235, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Philip Lowe, 2002. "Internal ratings, the business cycle and capital requirements: some evidence from an emerging market economy," FMG Discussion Papers dp428, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Nickell, Pamela & Perraudin, William & Varotto, Simone, 2000. "Stability of rating transitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 203-227, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Philip Lowe & Miguel A. Segoviano, 2002. "Internal ratings, the business cycle and capital requirements: some evidence from an emerging market economy," BIS Working Papers 117, Bank for International Settlements. [Downloadable!]
  20. Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2003. "Equilibrium Analysis, Banking and Financial Instability," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe08, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Blum, Jurg & Hellwig, Martin, 1995. "The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy requirements for banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 739-749, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Martin Shubik, 2000. "The Theory of Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1253, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Gordy, Michael B., 2000. "A comparative anatomy of credit risk models," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 119-149, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2000. "Default in a General Equilibrium Model with Incomplete Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1247, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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