The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

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The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

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Cantillon, Estelle

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Estelle Cantillon

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 62 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-25
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:1-25

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Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1279, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Harrison Cheng, 2005. "Ranking Sealed High-Bid and Open Asymmetric Auctions," IEPR Working Papers 05.26, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
Marco Pagnozzi, 2006. "Are Disadvantaged Bidders Doomed in Ascending Auctions?," CSEF Working Papers 169, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Marco Pagnozzi, 2008. "Are Disadvanteged Bidders Doomed In Ascending Auctions?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(3), pages 683-683, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Discussion Paper Series dp432, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000410, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "The Amsterdam Auction," Microeconomics 0205002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Lescourret, Laurence & Robert, Christian Y., 2006. "Preferencing, internalization and inventory position," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06017, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School. [Downloadable!]
Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2002. "A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp291, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
Patrick Bajari, . "Comparing Competition and Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Numerical Approach," Working Papers 00003, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005. [Downloadable!]
Shachat, Jason, 2009. "Procuring Commodities: Request for Quote or Reverse Auctions?," MPRA Paper 13418, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, 2003. "Bidder Asymmetry in Takeover Contests: The Role of Deal Protection Devices," Finance 0311011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 174, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 121473000000000021, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm387, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
- Fang, Hanming & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Multidimensional private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 1-30, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1276, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Arozamena, Leandro & Cantillon, Estelle, 2001. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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