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Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions

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Author Info
Marshall Robert C.
Meurer Michael J.
Richard Jean-Francois
Stromquist Walter
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 7 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 193-220
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:193-220

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Wayne-Roy Gayle & Jean Richard, 2008. "Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 245-278, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alexander Elbittar, 2003. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price Auctions: A Laboratory Study," Working Papers 0304, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Leslie M. Marx & Robert C. Marshall, 2004. "Bidder Collusion," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 108, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lescourret, Laurence & Robert, Christian Y., 2006. "Preferencing, internalization and inventory position," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06017, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School. [Downloadable!]
  5. Irene Martínez-Pardina, 2006. "First-price auctions where one of the bidders’ valuations is common knowledge," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 31-51, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Anders Lunander & Jan-Eric Nilsson, 2004. "Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, 2008. "Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 965-981. [Downloadable!]
  8. Patrick Bajari, . "Comparing Competition and Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Numerical Approach," Working Papers 00003, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Roberto Burguet & Martin Perry, 2007. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1219-1219. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Peter Cramton, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005. [Downloadable!]
  13. Gino Loyola, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," Economics Working Papers we083318, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jesse A. Schwartz & Ricardo Ungo, 2003. "Merging Auction Houses," Working Papers 0303, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  15. Giuseppe Lopomo & Robert Marshall & Leslie Marx, 2005. "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1156-1156. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1276, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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