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Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding

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Author Info
Robert H. Porter
J. Douglas Zona

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Abstract

We examine the institutional details of the school milk procurement process, bidding data, statements of dairy executives, and supply characteristics in Ohio during the 1980s. We compare the bidding behavior of a group of firms in Cincinnati to a control group. We find that the behavior of these firms is consistent with collusion. The estimated average effect of collusion on market prices is about 6.5%, or roughly the cost of shipping school milk about 50 miles.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199922%2930%3A2%3C263%3AOSMMAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 263-288
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:summer:p:263-288

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. James J. Heckman, 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, pages 120-137 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Discussion Papers 817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
  6. Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, 1987. "Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 187-197, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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