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Collusion in Auctions

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Kenneth Hendricks
Robert Porter

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 817.

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Date of creation: Jan 1989
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:817

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Geiss, Charles G & Kuhlman, John M, 1978. "Estimating Price Lists, List Changes, and Market Shares from Sealed Bids," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 193-209, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paarsch, H.J., 1989. "Empirical Models Of Auctions Within The Independent Private Values Paradigm And An Aplication To British Columbian Tiber Sales," UBC Departmental Archives 89-14, UBC Department of Economics.
  4. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Feinstein, Jonathan S & Block, Michael K & Nold, Frederick C, 1985. "Asymmetric Information and Collusive Behavior in Auction Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 441-60, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michael H. Riordan, 1985. "Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 41-50, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1988. "Reputation in repeated second-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 97-119, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Vernon A. Mund, 1960. "Identical Bid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68, pages 150. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Fehl, Ulrich & Guth, Werner, 1987. "Internal and external stability of bidder cartels in auctions and public tenders: A comparison of pricing rules," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 303-313. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. William S. Comanor & Mark A. Schankerman, 1976. "Identical Bids and Cartel Behavior," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 281-286, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena, 2004. "The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 180, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  2. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hiroshi Ohashi, 2008. "Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-548, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, . "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research," Working Papers 01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement," PSE Working Papers 2005-25, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hongjun Zhong, 2002. "postbid market interaction and auction choice," Microeconomics 0210002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1997. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," NBER Working Papers 6037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Albert Choi, 2004. "A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 759, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Optimality And The Second-Price Auction With Resale," Discussion Papers 2004_03, York University, Department of Economics, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
  10. In Lee, 1999. "Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 115-134, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. A. Banerji & J. V. Meenakshi, 2004. "Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Auction Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India," Working papers 129, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ephraim Clark & Gérard Mondello, 2000. "Water Management in France: Delegation and Irreversibility," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 325-352, November. [Downloadable!]
  13. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Saphores, Jean-Daniel & Vincent, Jeffrey R. & Marochko, Valy & Abrudan, Ioan & Bouriaud, Laura & Zinnes, Clifford, 2006. "Detecting collusion in timber auctions : an application to Romania," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4105, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  15. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2004_2, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers 1, York University, Department of Economics, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]
  17. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design: the European Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1937, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  18. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Efficient collusion in optimal auctions," Working Papers 200607, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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