1. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1063-1107, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2005. "Robustly collusion-proof implementation," Discussion Papers 0506-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Discussion Papers 817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 15-16, pages 11, Juillet-D. [Downloadable!]
5. Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, 2004. "The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1179-1219, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Colluding on Participation Decisions," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-030, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
   Other versions:
   • Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers 95.389, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
9. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
11. Armstrong, Mark & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Multi-dimensional screening:: A user's guide," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 959-979, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-99, August.
13. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
14. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2005. "Optimal Second-Degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 337-360, Summer.
    Other versions:
    • Doh Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2001. "Optimal Second-degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymetric Information among Buyers," Economics Working Papers 624, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
15. Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Papers of Peter Cramton 95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    • Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Working Papers 731, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics," MPRA Paper 6989, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1541-1563, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," MPRA Paper 6098, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," Discussion Papers 0506-22, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2007. "Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions," Discussion Papers 0708-05, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school). [Downloadable!]