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Efficient collusion in optimal auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Dequiedt, Vianney
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 136 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 302-323
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:302-323Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993.
"Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June.
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Other versions: Celik, Gorkem, 2004.
"Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008.
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Other versions: Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006.
"Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1063-1107, 07.
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Other versions: Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989.
"Collusion in Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Other versions: Dilip Mookherjee & Masatoshi Tsumagari, 2004.
"The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1179-1219, 07.
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Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991.
"Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
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Gregory Pavlov, 2006.
"Colluding on Participation Decisions ,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2006-030, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997.
"Collusion under Asymmetric Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
Other versions: d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979.
"Incentives and incomplete information ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
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Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000.
"A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
Armstrong, Mark & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999.
"Multi-dimensional screening:: A user's guide ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 959-979, April.
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Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997.
"Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-99, August.
McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992.
"Bidding Rings ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
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Other versions:
McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990.
"Bidding Rings ,"
Working Papers
726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2005.
"Optimal Second-Degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information Among Buyers ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 337-360, Summer.
Other versions: Cramton Peter C. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995.
"Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 255-283, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995.
"Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement ,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
[Downloadable!] Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1990.
"Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement ,"
Working Papers
731, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008.
"The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics ,"
MPRA Paper
6989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2007.
"Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions ,"
MPRA Paper
6098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2006.
"Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
0506-22, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim, 2007.
"Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
0708-05, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009.
"Optimal collusion-proof auctions ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Nicolas Gruyer, 2008.
"Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...") ,"
Economics Working Papers
06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
[Downloadable!]
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