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Empirical Models of Auctions

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  • Susan Athey
  • Philip A. Haile

Abstract

Many important economic questions arising in auctions can be answered only with knowledge of the underlying primitive distributions governing bidder demand and information. An active literature has developed aiming to estimate these primitives by exploiting restrictions from economic theory as part of the econometric model used to interpret auction data. We review some highlights of this recent literature, focusing on identification and empirical applications. We describe three insights that underlie much of the recent methodological progress in this area and discuss some of the ways these insights have been extended to richer models allowing more convincing empirical applications. We discuss several recent empirical studies using these methods to address a range of important economic questions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12126.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Publication status: published as Blundell, Richard, Whitney Newey, and Torsten Persson (eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics, The- ory and Applications: Ninth World Congress, Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, ch. 1, 1-45.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12126

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Charles A. Holt & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer & Jacob K. Goeree, 2007. "Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Reports, Center for Economic and Policy Studies 2007-03, Center for Economic and Policy Studies.
  2. Bruno Bosco & Lucia Parisio & Matteo Pelagatti, 2010. "Estimating Marginal Costs and Market Power in the Italian Electricity Auctions," Working Papers, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica 20100201, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica.
  3. Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Manipulative Auction Design," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001547, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Gian Luigi Albano & Federico Dini & Roberto Zampino, 2008. "Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2008.86, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 145-62, Spring.
  7. Bierens, Herman J. & Song, Hosin, 2012. "Semi-nonparametric estimation of independently and identically repeated first-price auctions via an integrated simulated moments method," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 108-119.
  8. Ivaldi, Marc & Motis, Jrissy, 2007. "Mergers as Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6434, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Paarsch, H. J., and Hong, H.: An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 205-208, October.
  10. Song, Zirui & Landrum, Mary Beth & Chernew, Michael E., 2013. "Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage: Effect of benchmark changes on plan bids," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1301-1312.
  11. Blancas, Luis & Chioda, Laura & Cordella, Tito & Oliveira, Alexandre & Vardy, Felix, 2011. "Do procurement rules impact infrastructure investment efficiency ? an empirical analysis of inversao das fases in Sao Paulo state," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 5528, The World Bank.

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