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LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school)

Economics Working Papers

Contact information of LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school):
Postal: 7, avenue Edouard Belin, BP 54005, 31055 Toulouse cedex 4
Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 17 40 17
Email:
Web page: http://www.enac.fr/recherche/leea/
More information through EDIRC

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Series handle: repec:enc:abcdef

2008

06 Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")
by Nicolas Gruyer [Downloadable!]
05 A model of airport slot allocation with posted prices
by Nicolas Gruyer & Kevin Guittet [Downloadable!]

2006

04 Quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs
by Nicolas Gruyer [Downloadable!]
03 When cost improvements harm consumers
by Nicolas Gruyer & Philippe Bontems [Downloadable!]

2005

02 Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude
by Nicolas Gruyer [Downloadable!]

2003

01 Auctioning airport slots (?)
by Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.