Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Computational Economics in its journal Computational Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Auctions; Numerical solution; Asymmetric first price; Independent private values; Ex-ante heterogeneity; Expected revenues; Optimal reserve; Collusion;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Donald, Stephen G. & Paarsch, Harry J., 1996. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(03), pages 517-567, August.
- Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 439-54, July.
- Steven A. Matthews, 1981.
"Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes,"
480S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthews, Steven A., 1983. "Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 370-400, August.
- Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979.
UCLA Economics Working Papers
152, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Athey, S., 1997.
"Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information,"
97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 2006. "Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-151, April.
- Lebrun, Bernard, 1996. "Existence of an Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 421-43, April.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bernard Lebrun, 1996. "Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 421-443.
- Florens, F. & Protopopescu, C. & Richard, J.-F., 1998. "Identification and Estimation of a Game Theoretic Models," Papers 98.499, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M., 2007. "Bidder collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 374-402, March.
- Wayne-Roy Gayle & Robert Marshall & Leslie Marx & Jean-François Richard, 2011. "Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 39-56, August.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2013.
"Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 26-35.
- Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli, 2011. "Testing for Collusion in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-564, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Arieh Gavious & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 369-393, May.
- Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard & Harry J. Paarsch, 2011.
"Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions,"
Carlo Alberto Notebooks
207, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Timothy Hubbard & René Kirkegaard & Harry Paarsch, 2013. "Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(2), pages 241-266, August.
- Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie Marx & Peng Sun, 2011. "Bidder collusion at first-price auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 177-211, September.
- Kirkegaard, René, 2009. "Asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1617-1635, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.