Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. tariff preferenes granted to Latin America

Contents:

Author Info

  • Silva, Peri

Abstract

This paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market. To this end, the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment. The predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the United States and Latin American countries. The results suggest that Latin American exporters and U.S. importers'lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the United States. More interestingly, these findings also show that U.S. importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences. These results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/03/06/000090341_20050306111321/Rendered/PDF/wps3518.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3518.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3518

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Export Competitiveness; Trade Policy; Environmental Economics&Policies; Rules of Origin; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Export Competitiveness; Environmental Economics&Policies; Rules of Origin; Trade and Regional Integration;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA.
  2. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Maggi, Giovanni & Rodriguez-Clare, Andres, 2000. "Import penetration and the politics of trade protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 287-304, August.
  4. Marcelo Olarreaga & Hiau Looi Kee & Alessandro Nicita, 2004. "Estimating Import Demand and Export Supply Elasticities," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 368, Econometric Society.
  5. Kala Krishna & Refik Erzan & Ling Hui Tan, 1991. "Rent Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement: Theory and Evidence from US Apparel Imports from Hong Kong," NBER Working Papers 3673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2006. "Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 563-571, August.
  7. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, 2005. "Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing," Development Working Papers 207, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  8. Giovanni Facchini & Marcelo Olarreaga & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2007. "Substitutability and protectionism: Latin AmericaÕs trade policy and imports from China and India," Working Papers 0705, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007.
  9. Emek Basker & Pham Hoang Van, 2008. "Imports "R" Us: Retail Chains as Platforms for Developing-Country Imports," Working Papers 0804, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 12 Aug 2008.
  10. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  11. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldbe & Giovanni Maggi, 1997. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Limao, Nuno & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2005. "Trade preferences to small developing countries and the welfare costs of lost multilateral liberalization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3565, The World Bank.
  13. Kee, Hiau Looi & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Silva, Peri, 2007. "Market access for sale," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 79-94, January.
  14. Gawande, Kishore, 1997. "Generated regressors in linear and nonlinear models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 119-126, February.
  15. Beata Smarzynska Javorcik & Wolfgang Keller & James R. Tybout, 2006. "Openness and Industrial Responses in a Wal-Mart World: A Case Study of Mexican Soaps, Detergents and Surfactant Producers," NBER Working Papers 12457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Hoekman, Bernard & Ozden, Caglar, 2005. "Trade preferences and differential treatment of developing countries : a selective survey," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3566, The World Bank.
  17. Schiff, Maurice, 1997. "Small is Beautiful: Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of Country Size, Market Share, and Smuggling," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 12, pages 359-387.
  18. Marcelo Olarreaga & Çaglar Özden, 2005. "AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 63-77, 01.
  19. Ray, Edward John, 1987. "The Impact of Special Interests on Preferential Tariff Concessions by the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(2), pages 187-93, May.
  20. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoglu, 2002. ""Protection For Sale" In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 497-508, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.