Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation
AbstractThis paper offers an initial exploration of a positive counterpart to the normative Ramsey-Diamond-Mirrlees theory of optimal commodity taxation. A model of lobbying for taxes and subsidies on production and consumption in an open economy is constructed, generalizing the Crossman-Helpman model of protection. It is found that the equilibrium of the lobbying process generally violates aggregate production efficiency, contrary to the normatively optimal policy. The outcome also differs markedly from the model of lobbying for protection: the equilibrium policy involves mostly production subsidies, not import tariffs.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Economic Association in its journal Eastern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 22 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: c/o Dr. Alexandre Olbrecht, The Anisfield School of Business 205, Ramapo College, 505 Ramapo Valley Road, Ramapo, New Jersey 07430, USA
Phone: (201) 684-7346
Web page: http://www.ramapo.edu/eea/journal.html
More information through EDIRC
Equilibrium; Lobbying; Subsidies; Taxation; Taxes;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 263-82, April.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993.
"Protection for Sale,"
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers, Tel Aviv 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-78, June.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson, College of the Holy Cross).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.