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Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy

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Author Info
Dixit, A.
Helpman, E.

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Abstract

We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principales'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs in its series Papers with number 179.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:priwpu:179

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Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON NEW- JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: LOBBYING; AUCTIONS;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

Cited by:
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  1. Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, 1999. "Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation," EPRU Working Paper Series 99-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Schleich, Joachim & Orden, David, 1996. "Efficient choice among domestic and trade policies in the Grossman-Helpman Interest-Group Model," Bulletins 7458, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cecilia Testa, 2001. "Reform, Lobbies and Welfare: A Common Agency Approach," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 01/6, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Marcel Vaillant, 1998. "Endogenous number of lobby groups in a specific factor trade model," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0198, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stephen Coate, 1999. "An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes," NBER Working Papers 7316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Francisco Rodriguez, 1999. "Inequality, Redistribution and Rent-Seeking," Electronic Working Papers 99-006, University of Maryland, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Do candidates serve parties interests? Party Polarization as a discipline device," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/13, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]
  9. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis, 2000. "Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 2482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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