Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy
AbstractWe develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principales'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs in its series Papers with number 179.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON NEW- JERSEY 08542 U.S.A.
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Dexit, A. & Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1996. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," Papers 11-96, Tel Aviv.
- Dixit, Avinash K & Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1436, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Marcel Vaillant, 1998. "Endogenous number of lobby groups in a specific factor trade model," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0198, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Stephen Coate, 1999.
"An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes,"
NBER Working Papers
7316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Coate, Stephen, 2000. "An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 437-55, April.
- Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez & Ana Torres Mata, 2004. "Corrupcion, inversion extranjera directa y reformas institucionales," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Negocios, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, Julio-Dic.
- Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis, 2000. "Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 2482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Schleich, Joachim & Orden, David, 1996. "Efficient choice among domestic and trade policies in the Grossman-Helpman Interest-Group Model," Bulletins 7458, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.