Market access for sale : Latin America's lobbying for U.S. tariff preferences
AbstractThis paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3198.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2004
Date of revision:
National Governance; Export Competitiveness; Environmental Economics&Policies; Rules of Origin; Economic Theory&Research; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; National Governance; Export Competitiveness; Environmental Economics&Policies; Poverty and Trade;
Other versions of this item:
- Kee, Hiau Looi & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Silva, Peri, 2003. "Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for US Tariff Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 4077, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-16 (All new papers)
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