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What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

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Author Info
Gawande, Kishore
Krishna, Pravin
Olarreaga, Marcelo

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Abstract

Policymaking power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society. However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others. This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political, and institutional factors. Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the welfare-mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated. This article investigates quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of governments and attempts to understand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government behavior across countries.

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File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818309090171
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 63 (2009)
Issue (Month): 03 (July)
Pages: 491-532
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:63:y:2009:i:03:p:491-532_09

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  9. Lohmann, Susanne & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1994. "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 48(4), pages 595-632, Autumn.
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