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Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States

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Author Info
Gawande, Kishore
Hoekman, Bernard

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Abstract

The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and political action committee (PAC) contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. They make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3819.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3819

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Related research
Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Free Trade; Consumption; Markets and Market Access; Technology Industry;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bernard Hoekman & Francis Ng & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2004. "Agricultural Tariffs or Subsidies: Which Are More Important for Developing Economies?," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 175-204.
  3. James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, 2002. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Olper, Alessandro, 1998. "Political Economy Determinants of Agricultural Protection Levels in EU Member States: An Empirical Investigation," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 463-87.
  5. Parker, Glenn R & Parker, Suzanne L, 1998. " The Economic Organization of Legislatures and How It Affects Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 117-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Hiau Looi Kee & Nicita, Alessandro & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2004. "Import demand elasticities and trade distortions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3452, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
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  10. Phillip McCalman, 2004. "Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Choi, E Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2004. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  12. Rigoberto A. Lopez, 2001. "Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 257-279, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Stratmann, Thomas, 1992. "The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1162-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Theo Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2002. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1702-1710, December. [Downloadable!]
  17. Gawande, Kishore, 2005. "The structure of lobbying and protection in U.S. agriculture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3722, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  18. Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker, 1998. "The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 117-129, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Gardner, Bruce L, 1987. "Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(2), pages 290-310, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoglu, 2002. ""Protection For Sale" In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 497-508, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2009. "Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 50299, World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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