The structure of lobbying and protection in U.S. agriculture
AbstractThe author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural protection. A detailed graphical analysis of campaign contributions by the agricultural PACs indicates that although there are very many PACs, in most sectors the majority of contributions are made by very few PACs. Econometric analysis reveals that lobbying spending by agricultural PACs is positively associated with the use of nontariff barriers and specific tariffs by the United States. There is a strong association between the average U.S. tariff on goods that benefit from U.S. export subsidies and lobbying spending. And there is no association between agricultural protection and trade measures such as import penetration and the export-to-output ratio.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3722.
Date of creation: 19 Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Economic Theory&Research; Politics and Government; Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems; Wetlands; ICT Policy and Strategies;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2005-12-14 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-INT-2005-12-14 (International Trade)
- NEP-POL-2005-12-14 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker, 1998. "The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 117-129, April.
- Dana L. Hoag & Thomas G. Field, 1999. "Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 397-407.
- Bruce L. Gardner, 1994.
"The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat,"
NBER Working Papers
4747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce Gardner, 1996. "The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat," NBER Chapters, in: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, pages 291-334 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stephen P. MacGee, 1972. "The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on U.S. Trade," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 3(3), pages 645-708.
- Jonathan C. Brooks & A. Colin Cameron & Colin A. Carter, 1998. "Political Action Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(3), pages 441-454.
- Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999.
"Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
- van Bastelaer, Thierry, 1998. " The Political Economy of Food Pricing: An Extended Empirical Test of the Interest Group Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 43-60, July.
- kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA.
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- Robert W. Crandall, 1978. "Federal Government Initiatives to Reduce the Price Level," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 9(2), pages 401-452.
- Swinnen, Johan F.M., 1991. "A Positive Theory Of Agricultural Protection," Working Papers 6851, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Gardner, Bruce L, 1987. "Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(2), pages 290-310, April.
- Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoglu, 2002. ""Protection For Sale" In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 497-508, August.
- Olper, Alessandro, 1998. "Political Economy Determinants of Agricultural Protection Levels in EU Member States: An Empirical Investigation," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 463-87.
- Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2000.
07-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
- Parker, Glenn R & Parker, Suzanne L, 1998. " The Economic Organization of Legislatures and How It Affects Congressional Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 117-29, April.
- Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006.
"Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006. "Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(03), pages 527-561, July.
- Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006. "Lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the United States," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3819, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.