The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting
AbstractThe theoretical public-choice literature suggests that vote trading is an important determinant of congressional voting behavior. Yet empirical voting models do not allow for vote trading. These models recognize that observed ideology may influence legislative behavior but do not correct for unobserved ideology. This study devises new tests for logrolling and ideology. The empirical model controls for logroll agreements and unobserved ideological interest via the correlation of unobserved variables. The results reflect the presence of vote-trading coalitions on some votes but not on others. The results cast doubt on the importance of personal ideological interests of legislators. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 82 (1992)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
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