Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mansfield, Edward D.
  • Milner, Helen V.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter

Abstract

Over the past fty years, barriers to international trade havedecreased substantially. While the decline in protectionism since WorldWar II has stemmed partly from unilateral changes in trade policy bycountries, it has also been a result of agreements among countries toliberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the conditions underwhich states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explorethe domestic factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We arguethat the likelihood of states cooperating on trade policy dependscrucially on their regime type: as states become more democratic, theyare increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S002081830244177X
File Function: link to article abstract page
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 03 (June)
Pages: 477-513

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:03:p:477-513_44

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Fax: +44 (0)1223 325150
Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_INOProvider-Email:journals@cambridge.org

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:03:p:477-513_44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.