Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism: Evidence from the Caribbean
AbstractThere exist legal channels for informational lobbying of US policymakers by foreign principals. Foreign governments and private sector principals frequently and intensively use this institutional channel to lobby on trade and tourism issues. This paper empirically studies whether such lobbying effectively achieves its goal of trade promotion in the context of Caribbean tourism, and suggests the potential for using foreign lobbying as a vehicle for development. Panel data are used to explore and quantify the association between foreign lobbying by Caribbean principals and US tourist arrivals to Caribbean destinations. A variety of sensitivity analyses support the finding of a strong association. The policy implications are obvious and potentially important for developing countries.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 90 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec
Foreign lobbying Tourism Panel data;
Other versions of this item:
- Gawande, Kishore & Maloney, William & Montes Rojas, Gabriel V., 2009. "Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism : evidence from the Caribbean," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4834, The World Bank.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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