To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross National Externalities
AbstractThis paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying. We show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities. We argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying. We also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country. A key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not. We illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1402.
Date of creation: 10 Jan 2014
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-01-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-INT-2014-01-17 (International Trade)
- NEP-POL-2014-01-17 (Positive Political Economics)
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