Corruption in Procurement and Public Purchase
AbstractThe paper studies the impact of corruption threat in procurement an dpublic purchases. It explores the consequences of the unobservability of people integrity and considers the problem of both capture and extortion. It shows that extortion is not fight against because it is not harmful to the principal, contrary to capture which is costly. This distinction implies that when corruptibility increases among the population the optimal answer of the organization is to shift from a capture regime to an extortion regime.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 98a29.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
More information through EDIRC
CORRUPTION ; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;
Other versions of this item:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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