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Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

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Author Info
Irina Slinko (CEFIR)
Evgeny Yakovlev (CEFIR)
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya () (New Economic School/CEFIR and CERP)

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Abstract

How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using micro-level data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: 1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; 2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; 3) capture adversely affects small business growth and the tax capacity of the state; 4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0031.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0031

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Related research
Keywords: Regulatory capture institutional subversion Russia redistribution special interest politics

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
P27 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2006. "Non-wage benefits, costs of turnover, and labor attachment: evidence from Russian firms," Working Papers w0062, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alexander Dyck & Natalya Volchkova & Luigi Zingales, 2006. "The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia," NBER Working Papers 12525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Milanovic, Branko & Hoff, Karla & Horowitz, Shale, 2008. "Transition from Communism: Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence," MPRA Paper 9642, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alexander Libman & Lars P. Feld, 2007. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia," CREMA Working Paper Series 2007-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Haaparanta, Pertti & Juurikkala, Tuuli & Lazareva, Olga & Pirttilä, Jukka & Solanko, Laura & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Firms and public service provision in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/2003, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "State Capture in a Federation," Working Papers w0093, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  7. Claeys, Sophie & Schoors, Koen, 2007. "Bank supervision Russian style: Evidence of conflicts between micro- and macroprudential concerns," Working Paper Series 205, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-152, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Governance Redux: The Empirical Challenge," MPRA Paper 8210, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Deregulation of Business," Working Papers w0097, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Donato De Rosa, 2006. "Explaining Russian Manufacturing Exports: Firm Characteristics and External Conditions," PSE Working Papers 2006-22, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  12. Zakolyukina Anastasia, 2006. "Bankrtuptcy in Russia: External Management Performance," EERC Working Paper Series 06-09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  13. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin," Working Papers w0094, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence," Working Papers w0038, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  15. Ponomareva, Maria & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2004. "Federal Tax Arrears in Russia: Liquidity Problems, Federal Redistribution or Russian Resistance?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4267, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Simeon Djankov & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Entrepreneurship in Brazil, China, and Russia," Working Papers w0066, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  17. Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva, 2004. "To Divest or not to Divest? Social Assets in Russian Firms," ERSA conference papers ersa04p637, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  18. Phong T. H. Ngo, 2006. "International Prudential Regulation, Regulatory Risk and the Cost of Bank Capital," ANUCBE School of Economics Working Papers 2006-463, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Sergei Guriev & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Inter-Regional Trade and Lobbying," Working Papers w0100, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  20. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Sergei Guriev, 2007. "Inter-State Spillovers and Lobbying," Working Papers WP13_2007_16, Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  21. Svetlana Avdasheva & Victoria Golikova & Fumikazu Sugiura & Andrei Yakovlev, 2007. "External Relationship of Russian Corporations," Discussion Paper Series b37, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
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