This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Economics and Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Pokrivcak, Jan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper provides a literature review of selected aspects of economics and political economy of regional trade agreements. From a static perspective regional trade agreements have ambiguous effects on the welfare. Assumption of welfare maximization cannot explain the proliferation of regional trade agreements as it cannot explain extensive use of trade barriers. New political economy approach endogenizes trade policy as well as decisions to form a regional trade agreement. According to major models of political economy, regional trade agreements are likely to be formed when they secure higher protection and trade diversion. Furthermore the literature mostly concludes that integration affects external tariffs.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7286
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by TRADEAG - Agricultural Trade Agreements in its series Working Papers with number 7286.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ags:tragwp:7286

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://tradeag.vitamib.com/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (AgEcon Search).

Related research
Keywords: International Relations/Trade;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Wonnacott, Paul & Wonnacott, Ronald, 1981. "Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 704-14, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Wonnacott, Paul & Wonnacott, Ronald, 1992. "The Customs Union Issue Reopened," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 119-35, June.
  4. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2005. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 11371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "The Economics of the World Trading System," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524341.
  6. Cadot, O. & De Melo, J. & Olarreaga, M., 1996. "Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-Members," University of Geneva Economics Working Papers 96.07, University of Geneva, Department of Political Economy.
    Other versions:
  7. Whalley, John, 1990. "Non-discriminatory Discrimination: Special and Differential Treatment under the GATT for Developing Countries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1318-28, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Richard Baldwin, 1993. "A Domino Theory of Regionalism," NBER Working Papers 4465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
  16. Lawrence H. Summers, 1991. "Regionalism and the world trading system," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 295-301.
  17. Panagariya, Arvind & Findlay, Ronald & DEC, 1994. "A political - economy analysis of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1261, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  18. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Cheh, John H., 1974. "United States concessions in the Kennedy Round and short-run labor adjustment costs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 323-340, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 107-133, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Pravin Krishna, 1998. "Regionalism And Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 227-250, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Arvind Panagariya, 2000. "Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 287-331, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Ornelas, Emanuel, 2005. "Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 471-497, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Harry G. Johnson, 1965. "An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 256. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Berglas, Eitan, 1979. "Preferential Trading Theory: The n Commodity Case," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 315-31, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Levy, Philip I, 1997. "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 506-19, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Baldwin, Robert E, 1989. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 119-35, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 667-90, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  33. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 2700 working paper series are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.