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Federal Tax Arrears in Russia: Liquidity Problems, Federal Redistribution, or Regional Resistance?

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Author Info
Maria Ponomareva (Northwestern University)
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya () (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, Center for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow, and CEPR)

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Abstract

Three hypotheses about the nature of federal tax arrears in Russia in the second half of the 1990s are tested empirically. Tax arrears can be a result of: 1) liquidity problems in firms, 2) redistribute subsidies of the federal government, or 3) regional political resistance to federal tax collectors. Liquidity problems in firms explain a large part of variation in tax arrears. Regional political resistance to federal tax collectors was also an important factor: For a given level of liquidity, federal arrears accumulated faster in regions where governors had larger popular base, regions with better bargaining position vis-a-vis the center, and regions with governors in political opposition to the center. We find that patterns of federal arrears are inconsistent with redistributive politics premise that redistribution favors jurisdictions with “closer races” for the incumbent on the national elections. Variation in authorized tax deferrals, in part, can be explained by federal redistributive politics.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0003.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0003

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Keywords: Tax arrears Regional protection Russia Transition Redistributive politics

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
R5 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

Cited by:
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  1. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a natural bankruptcy experiment," PSE Working Papers 2006-30, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant," Working Papers w0099, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Alexander Libman & Lars P. Feld, 2007. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia," CREMA Working Paper Series 2007-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-152, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp737, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Klugman, Jeni & Micklewright, John & Redmond, Gerry, 2002. "Poverty in the Transition: Social Expenditures and the Working-Age Poor," CEPR Discussion Papers 3389, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Zakolyukina Anastasia, 2006. "Bankrtuptcy in Russia: External Management Performance," EERC Working Paper Series 06-09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
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