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Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard

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Abstract

The optimal design of credit contracts and bankruptcy procedures is an important policy question both in developed market economies and in countries with emerging markets. In this paper I deal with several theoretical considerations related to these important policy problems. My main concern is with the impact of relaxation of bankruptcy procedures providing for a possibility of a renegotiation of the debt instead of strictly imposing bankruptcy whenever the debtor falls into a default on his debt. I deal with this problem in a context of collateralized debt contracts in the conditions of imperfect information about the prospects of the entrepreneur and about the results of his project.

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File URL: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/1286
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number 61.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision: 2004
Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp061

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Related research

Keywords: bankruptcy; moral hazard; adverse selection; soft budget constraint;

References

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  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin, 1995. "Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9603, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Helmut Bester, 1990. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0001, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
  3. John P. Bonin & Mark E. Schaffer, 1999. "Revisiting Hungary's Bankruptcy Episode," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 255, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  4. Chongwoo Choe, 1995. "Contract Design and Costly Verification Games," Working Papers 1995.18, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  5. Janos Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gerard Roland, 2002. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Economics Working Papers 0019, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  6. Maskin, Eric & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2001. "Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2715, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  8. Schaffer, Mark E., 1998. "Do Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft Budget Constraints? A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 80-103, March.
  9. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
  10. Claessens, Stijn & Klapper, Leora F., 2002. "Bankruptcy around the world - explanations of its relative use," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2865, The World Bank.
  11. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  12. Schmidt-Mohr, Udo, 1997. "Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 1321-1342, July.
  13. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "The credible-commitment problem in the center-enterprise relationship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 359-382, September.
  14. Khalil, Fahad & Parigi, Bruno M, 1998. "Loan Size as a Commitment Device," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 135-50, February.
  15. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-19, July.
  16. Coco, G., 1998. "On the Use of Collateral," Discussion Papers 9805, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  17. Scheepens, Joris P. J. F., 1995. "Bankruptcy litigation and optimal debt contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 535-556, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Karel Janda, 2009. "Bankruptcies With Soft Budget Constraint," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(4), pages 430-460, 07.
  2. František Turnovec, 2005. "Arithmetic of Property Rights: A Leontief-type Model of Ownership Structures," Working Papers IES 70, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  3. Tomáš Cahlík & Tomáš Honzák & Jana Honzáková & Marcel Jiřina & Natálie Reichlová, 2005. "Convergence of Consumption Structure," Working Papers IES 99, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  4. Miloslav Vošvrda & Lukáš Vácha, 2007. "Heterogeneous Agents Model with the Worst Out Algorithm," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 54-66, March.
  5. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Comparative Statics of the Effects of Credit Guarantees and Subsidies in the Competitive Lending Market," Working Papers IES 82, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  6. Ondøej Vychodil & Ondøej Knot, 2004. "What Drives the Optimal Bankruptcy Law Design?," Working Papers IES 62, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
  7. Kodera J. & Vosvrda M., 2005. "Production, Capital Stock and Price Dynamics in Simple Model of Closed Economy," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 287, Society for Computational Economics.
  8. Tomáš Cahlík & Adam Geršl & Michal Hlaváček & Michael Berlemann, 2005. "Market Prices as Indicators of Political Events Evidence from the Experimental Market on the Czech Republic Parliamentary Election in 2002," Working Papers IES 77, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  9. Katerina Smidkova & Ales Bulir, 2004. "Would Fast Sailing Towards the Euro Be Smooth?: What Fundamental Real Exchange Rates Tell Us About Acceding Economies," Macroeconomics 0408002, EconWPA.
  10. Adam Geršl, 2005. "Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform," Working Papers IES 98, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  11. Ondøej Knot & Ondøej Vychodil, 2006. "Czech Bankruptcy Procedures: Ex-post Efficiency View," Working Papers IES 2006/03, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jan 2006.
  12. Wadim Strielkowski & Cathal O'Donoghue, 2005. "Ready to Go? EU Enlargement and Migration Potential: Lessons from the Czech Republic in the Context of the Irish Migration Experience," Working Papers IES 74, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  13. František Turnovec, 2005. "New Measure of Voting Power," Working Papers IES 69, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.
  14. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
  15. Kolecek, Ludek, 2008. "Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 40-61, April.
  16. Kateřina Tsolov, 2005. "ADR/GDR Potential in Central Europe," Working Papers IES 92, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005.

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