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Bankruptcy Procedures with Ex Post Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Karel Janda () (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

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Abstract

The optimal design of credit contracts and bankruptcy procedures is an important policy question both in developed market economies and in countries with emerging markets. In this paper I deal with several theoretical considerations related to these important policy problems. My main concern is with the impact of relaxation of bankruptcy procedures providing for a possibility of a renegotiation of the debt instead of strictly imposing bankruptcy whenever the debtor falls into a default on his debt. I deal with this problem in a context of collateralized debt contracts in the conditions of imperfect information about the prospects of the entrepreneur and about the results of his project.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its series Working Papers IES with number 61.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision: 2004
Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp061

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Related research
Keywords: bankruptcy; moral hazard; adverse selection; soft budget constraint;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Scheepens, Joris P. J. F., 1995. "Bankruptcy litigation and optimal debt contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 535-556, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eric Maskin & Chenggang Xu, 2001. "Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 9(1), pages 1-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Choe, Chongwoo, 1998. "Contract design and costly verification games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 327-340, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Janos Kornai & Eric Maskin & Gerard Roland, 2003. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1095-1136, December.
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  5. Manove, Michael & Padilla, Atilano Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 2439, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Claessens, Stijn & Klapper, Leora F., 2002. "Bankruptcy around the world - explanations of its relative use," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2865, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Schaffer, Mark E., 1998. "Do Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft Budget Constraints? A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 80-103, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "The credible-commitment problem in the center-enterprise relationship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 359-382, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Schmidt-Mohr, Udo, 1997. "Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 1321-1342, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Coco, Giuseppe, 2000. " On the Use of Collateral," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(2), pages 191-214, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  12. Khalil, Fahad & Parigi, Bruno M, 1998. "Loan Size as a Commitment Device," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 135-50, February.
  13. Dewatripont, M & Maskin, E, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(4), pages 541-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  17. John Bonin & Mark E. Schaffer, 1999. "Revisiting Hungary's Bankruptcy Episode," CERT Discussion Papers 9906, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kateřina Šmídková & Aleš Bulíř, 2004. "Would Fast Sailing towards the Euro Be Smooth? What Fundamental Real Exchange Rates Tells Us about Acceding Economies," Working Papers IES 64, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Kateřina Tsolov, 2005. "ADR/GDR Potential in Central Europe," Working Papers IES 92, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  3. František Turnovec, 2005. "New Measure of Voting Power," Working Papers IES 69, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Karel Janda, 2005. "The Comparative Statics of the Effects of Credit Guarantees and Subsidies in the Competitive Lending Market," Working Papers IES 82, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lukáš Vácha & Miloslav Vošvrda, 2005. "Heterogeneous Agents Model with the Worst Out Algorithm," Working Papers IES 91, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Tomáš Cahlík & Tomáš Honzák & Jana Honzáková & Marcel Jiřina & Natálie Reichlová, 2005. "Convergence of Consumption Structure," Working Papers IES 99, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tomáš Cahlík & Adam Geršl & Michal Hlaváček & Michael Berlemann, 2005. "Market Prices as Indicators of Political Events Evidence from the Experimental Market on the Czech Republic Parliamentary Election in 2002," Working Papers IES 77, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  8. Adam Geršl, 2005. "Political Economy of Public Deficit: Perspectives for Constitutional Reform," Working Papers IES 98, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  9. František Turnovec, 2005. "Arithmetic of Property Rights: A Leontief-type Model of Ownership Structures," Working Papers IES 70, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Jan Kodera & Miroslav Vošvrda, 2005. "Production, Capital Stock and Price Dynamics in a Simple Model of Closed Economy," Working Papers IES 93, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Wadim Strielkowski & Cathal O'Donoghue, 2005. "Ready to Go? EU Enlargement and Migration Potential: Lessons from the Czech Republic in the Context of the Irish Migration Experience," Working Papers IES 74, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ondøej Vychodil & Ondøej Knot, 2004. "What Drives the Optimal Bankruptcy Law Design?," Working Papers IES 62, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004. [Downloadable!]
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