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Agency Theory Approach To The Contracting Between Lender And Borrower

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Author Info
Karel Janda

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Abstract

The paper provides an overview of several selected topics dealing with application of agency theory to the credit contracts. The costly state verification and costly punishment models of optimal debt contracts are introduced and compared with respect to their performance in the situation characterized by risk aversion. Adverse selection in credit markets and its solution with a menu of screening contracts is described and the use of collateral as a screening instrument is discussed. The dynamic relationship between the lender and borrower is introduced in a soft budget constraint model of default and bankruptcy decisions. Alternative assumptions about informational asymmetries in credit markets are presented as well. For all these topics a number of references from Czech and iternational economic literature is provided.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Acta Oeconomica Pragensia.

Volume (Year): 2006 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 34-47
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Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2006:y:2006:i:3:id:84:p:34-47

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Related research
Keywords: principal; agent; contracts; credit; adverse selection; moral hazard;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

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