Monopolistic credit market in the conditions of imperfect information
AbstractImperfect information in the monopolistic credit market could lead to the rejection of credit provision to some applicants for credit. The choice of which class of borrowers is rejected credit depends on the relations among some characteristics of borrowers. The inefficiency of credit market could be alleviated by government credit guarantees.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Economics, Prague in its journal Prague Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 2000 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Postal: Editorial office Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, Czech Republic
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- Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
- Karel Janda, 2008. "Which Government Interventions Are Good in Alleviating Credit Market Failures?," Working Papers IES 2008/12, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2008.
- Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power," Working Papers IES 2011/18, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2011.
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