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Collateralized debt as the optimal contract

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Author Info
Jeffrey M. Lacker

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Abstract

In a simple risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under which a collateralized debt contract is the optimal allocation. The critical condition for optimality is that the borrower values the collateral good more highly than does the lender; otherwise the optimal contract does not resemble debt. Limited collateral can give rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint, driving a further wedge between the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the borrower and the lender. I argue that perhaps all debt contracts are implicitly collateralized. ; Revision of Working Paper 90-03

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number 98-04.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:98-04

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Keywords: Debt

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Benjamin, Daniel K, 1978. "The Use of Collateral to Enforce Debt Contracts," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 333-59, July.
  2. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Lacker, J.M., 1989. "Optimal Contracts Under Costly State Falsification," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 956, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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  5. Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-61, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jaffee, Dwight & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1990. "Credit rationing," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 837-888 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Williamson, Stephen D, 1987. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 135-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Debt Contracts with Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 573-595, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1989. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," Working papers 520, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  14. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  16. Barro, Robert J, 1976. "The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(4), pages 439-56, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, Ivan, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2000. "Risky collateral and deposit insurance," Staff Report 274, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. David C. Mills, Jr., 2005. "Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-55, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gertler, M. & Rose, A., 1991. "Finance, growth, and public policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 814, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Daniela Fabbri, 2001. "The Legal Enforcement of Credit Contracts and the Level of Investment," CSEF Working Papers 57, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  5. Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kenneth Kasa, 1998. "Borrowing constraints and asset market dynamics: evidence from the Pacific Basin," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 17-28. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Cheng Wang & Stephen D. Williamson, 1993. "Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening," Finance 9310001, EconWPA, revised 02 Nov 1993. [Downloadable!]
  8. Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1999. "Limited commitment and central bank lending," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 1-27. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni, 2002. "Costly State Verification And Debt Contracts," Departmental Working Papers 172, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
  10. repec:fip:fedreq:y:1991:i:jul/aug:p:3-19:n:v.77no.4 is not listed on IDEAS
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