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Liars Never Prosper? How Management Misrepresentation Reduces Monitoring Costs

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  • Persons, John C.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

    Volume (Year): 6 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 4 (October)
    Pages: 269-306

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:6:y:1997:i:4:p:269-306

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

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    Cited by:
    1. Larry D. Wall & Timothy W. Koch, 2000. "Bank loan-loss accounting: a review of theoretical and empirical evidence," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q2, pages 1-20.
    2. Larry Wall & Robert Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 223-245, December.
    3. A. Menichini & P. Simmons, . "Can Liars Ever Prosper," Discussion Papers 02/10, Department of Economics, University of York.
    4. Annamaria Menichini, 2000. "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers 41, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jan 2006.
    5. Jean-Baptiste, Eslyn L. & Santomero, Anthony M., 2000. "The Design of Private Reinsurance Contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 274-297, July.

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