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Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences

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Author Info
Rubinstein, Ariel
Wolinsky, Asher

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Abstract

This paper explores how the requirement that the implementation of contracts be renegotiation-proof affects the set of contracts that can be implemented in a seller-buyer scenario in which the information regarding the agents' valuations is nonverifiable. This paper explicitly adds a time dimension to an implementation problem and introduces a natural criterion of renegotiation-proofness for the case of time-consuming renegotiation. The main insight gained is that the addition of the time dimension enlarges significantly the set of contracts that can be implemented in a renegotiation-proof manner. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 82 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 600-614
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:82:y:1992:i:3:p:600-614

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9711003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Evans, R., 2006. "Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0626, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Working Papers 04-21, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  7. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Coasian Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 362, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1998. "Implementation and Renegotiation - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 366, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  9. Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Discussion Papers 1051, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Jim Brennan & Joel Watson, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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