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Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting

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  • Fahad Khalil
  • David Martimort
  • Bruno Maria Parigi

Abstract

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when principals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others’ monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding in monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear. Free riding may be so strong that there may even be less monitoring than if the principals cooperated with each other, which shows that non-cooperative monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessive monitoring.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1514.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1514

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Keywords: monitoring; common agency; costly state verification;

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Cited by:
  1. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
  2. Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François & Attar, Andrea, 2014. "Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  3. Burnett, Johann Caro & Carrasco, Vinicius, 2011. "Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 606-627, September.
  4. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.

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