This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Claudio Mezzetti

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

I analyze a common agency relationship where the agent has private information about the difference in his value for two principals. When the principals independently offer incentive contracts, the agent specializes less than is socially efficient, but more than when they cooperate and choose the contract that maximizes their joint payoff. Under both arrangements the agent faces countervailing incentives. The pooling region of types receiving a flat fee is larger and the incentive pay of the remaining types is lower powered under cooperation than under independent contracting. The principals prefer independent contracting with a common agent to exclusive dealing.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199722%2928%3A2%3C323%3ACAWHDP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 323-345
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:summer:p:323-345

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1037-1037. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2000. "International Competition for R&D Investments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  3. Xiaodong Wu, 2000. ""Pollution Havens" and the Regulation of Multinationals by Multiple Governments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1766, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition," MPRA Paper 6992, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Xiaodong Wu, 2004. "Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(2), pages 1265-1265. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. MARTIMORT, David & STOLE, Lars, 1999. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," IDEI Working Papers 110, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
  8. KHALIL, Fahad & MARTIMORT, David & PARIGI, Bruno, 2004. "Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting," IDEI Working Papers 321, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nicola Lacetera, 2003. "Incentives and spillovers in R&D activities: an agency-theoretic analysis of industry-university relations," Microeconomics 0312004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jong-Hee Hahn, 2000. "Network Competition and Interconnection with Heterogeneous Subscribers," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2000/11, Department of Economics, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Alessio D'Amato, 2002. "Common Agency And Pollution Control," Departmental Working Papers 173, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
  12. Thomas A. Gresik & Eric W. Bond, 2004. "Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 42, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  13. Fahad Khalil & David Martimort & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2005. "Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  14. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  15. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2000. "Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.