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On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting

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Alessandro Pavan

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Theory workshop papers with number 658612000000000067.

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Date of creation: 15 Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000067

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 214-231, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 1991. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 579, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2002. "Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 587-604, Winter.
  4. Taylor, Curtis R., 2002. "Private Demands and Demands for Privacy: Dynamic Pricing and the Market for Customer Information," Working Papers 02-02, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Taylor, Curtis R., 2003. "Privacy in Competitive Markets," Working Papers 03-10, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. David P. Baron, 1985. "Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 553-568, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1997. "Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 205-36.
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  8. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting With Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Claudio Mezzetti, 1997. "Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 323-345, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  13. Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2197-2224, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1037-1037. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Dirk & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1206, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Michael A. Raith, 1993. "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 260, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Monopoly with Resale," Working Papers 2003.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
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  21. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
  22. Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-98, July.
  25. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 757-791, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Prat, A. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Sequential common agency," Discussion Paper 95, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  28. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  29. MARTIMORT, David & STOLE, Lars, 1999. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," IDEI Working Papers 110, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
Full references

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2008. "Who Benefits From Online Privacy?," Working Papers 08-26, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bennardo, Alberto & Pagano, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2009. "Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Managment," Working Papers 07-29, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Calzolari, Giacomo & Scarpa, Carlo, 2007. "Regulating a Multi-Utility Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 6238, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Diaw, K.M. & Pouyet J.,, 2004. "Competition, incomplete discrimination and versioning," Discussion Paper 69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2008. "Privacy, Publicity, and Choice," Working Papers 0809, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Carlo Scarpa & Giacomo Calzolari, 2009. "On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist," Working Papers 2009.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Economics Working Papers 2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2006. "Opt In Versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry Analysis of Privacy Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Katz, 2006. "Privacy, property rights and efficiency: The economics of privacy as secrecy," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 209-239, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Calzolari, Giacomo & Scarpa, Carlo, 2007. "Footloose Monopolies: Regulating a "National Champion"," CEPR Discussion Papers 6413, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Clare Leaver & Gian Luigi Albano, 2004. "Transparency, Recruitment and Retention in the Public Sector," Economics Series Working Papers 219, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Kai-Lung Hui & I.P.L. Png, 2005. "The Economics of Privacy," Industrial Organization 0505007, EconWPA, revised 29 Aug 2005. [Downloadable!]
  15. Mark Armstrong, 2005. "Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination," Industrial Organization 0511004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  16. Gian Luigi Albano & Clare Leaver, 2005. "Transparency, Recuitment and Retention in the Public Sector," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/132, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  17. Khaled Diaw & Jérôme Pouyet, 2005. "Information, competition and (In) complete discrimination," Working Papers hal-00243025_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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