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Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability

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Author Info
Andrew F. Daughety
Jennifer F. Reinganum

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Abstract

We explore informational externalities that arise when multiple plaintiffs are harmed by the behavior or product of a single defendant. An early plaintiff is likely to raise the awareness of a later plaintiff, and the later plaintiff will be able to learn something about the defendant's culpability by observing the disposition of the early suit: the presence of an early plaintiff provides a benefit to a later plaintiff. The presence of the later plaintiff also confers a potential benefit on the early plaintiff: the early plaintiff has the opportunity to charge the defendant for controlling the flow of information (e.g., through confidential settlement).

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 33 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 587-604
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:33:y:2002:i:winter:p:587-604

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  1. repec:bep:thetop:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1117-1117 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  3. repec:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1143-1143 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2003. "Secrecy and Safety," Working Papers 0317, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," NBER Working Papers 10943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1404, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Kathryn Spier, 2001. "The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1024, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel, 2007. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," MPRA Paper 6104, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2002. "Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses In Settlement Bargaining," Working Papers 0221, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Oct 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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