Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability
AbstractWe explore informational externalities that arise when multiple plaintiffs are harmed by the behavior or product of a single defendant. An early plaintiff is likely to raise the awareness of a later plaintiff, and the later plaintiff will be able to learn something about the defendant's culpability by observing the disposition of the early suit: the presence of an early plaintiff provides a benefit to a later plaintiff. The presence of the later plaintiff also confers a potential benefit on the early plaintiff: the early plaintiff has the opportunity to charge the defendant for controlling the flow of information (e.g., through confidential settlement).
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 33 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004.
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