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Secrecy and Safety Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Andrew Daughety (Vanderbilt University)
Jennifer Reinganum (Vanderbilt University)
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Paper provided by American Law & Economics Association in its series American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings with number
1039.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991.
"High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995.
"Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992.
"Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling ,"
Working Papers
94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994.
"Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling ,"
Game Theory and Information
9403007, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 1994.
[Downloadable!] Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2002.
"Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 587-604, Winter.
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1999.
"Hush Money ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 661-678, Winter.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986.
"Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Yang, Bill Z., 1996.
"Litigation, experimentation, and reputation ,"
International Review of Law and Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 491-502, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mark N. Hertzendorf, 1993.
"I'm Not a High-Quality Firm -- But I Play One on TV ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 236-247, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986.
"Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002.
"Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bagwell, K., 1991.
"Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality ,"
Papers
e-91-11, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Other versions:
Kyle Bagwell, 1991.
"Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality ,"
Discussion Papers
921, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Bagwell, Kyle, 1992.
"Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 151-74, Spring.
Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987.
"Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Mark N. Hertzendorf & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2001.
"Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(4), pages 621-662, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Linnemer, L., 1996.
"Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals ,"
Papers
9628, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007.
"Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling ,"
Working Papers
0703, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2007.
"Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
07-081/1, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006.
"Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks ,"
NBER Working Papers
12776, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006.
"Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information ,"
Working Papers
0613, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005.
"Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling ,"
Working Papers
0520, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Bruno Deffains, 2006.
"Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
06-071/1, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006.
"Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure ,"
Working Papers
0625, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!]
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